[No off-topic comments please. Go to open thread]
This is going to send commenter RR into panic mode.
A new paper claims to have found molecular genetic evidence that IQ is every bit as heritable as twin studies show.
The paper’s quite complex and there are some people here who no matter how many times they read it, will never be able to understand it.Β They simply don’t have the physiological genetic brain power to process such complex reading material.
And sadly one of those people is Mug of Pee.
And sadly one of those people is peepee.
Who visibly can’t explain how the paper vindicates twin studies. It doesn’t.
Didn’t say they vindicated twin studies, only that some here would not understand their paper. And judging by your vapid reply, i was right π
Oh sorry, I can tell from your very thorough article that you have an expert understanding of the paper.
“A new paper claims to have found molecular genetic evidence that IQ is every bit as heritable as twin studies show.”
*claims
And it’s shared-environment. The missing heritability problem is due to the falsity of the EEA.
Except you add:
The paperβs quite complex and there are some people here who no matter how many times they read it, will never be able to understand it.
Implying we’re too dumb to understand why the claim is right.
Implying that their reasoning was complex, not that their conclusions were necessarily right.
The complexity is something you state, not something you imply. The implied consequence is that we are too dumb to understand that much smarter people than us have vindicated twin studies.
Implying some will not understand why it’s right or wrong.
Implying you’re one of those understanding why it’s right.
No it needn’t imply that
Then what would send RR into panic?
Fear of the unknown.
Monsters live in the dark.
I think RR is an anthropomorphic being gifted with organs colloquially called balls. So I guess it’s not enough.
What’s their reasoning? What’s the argument?
Genes don’t even cause psychological traits indirectly so “gene searching” seems like a moot issue. Genes can’t cause psychological traits because there are no strict psychophysical laws. The mental is undetermined by the physical.
…….The mental is undetermined by the physical……
So how physicology can explain behavior**
Physiology or psychology?
This is going to send commenter RR into panic mode.
uhhh…no.
The pedigree-based estimates capture shared-environment. A mechanism needs to be identified out of the associated SNPs—lest they commit cum hoc ergo propter hoc—and one won’t be identified because the mental is underdetermined by the physical.
Don’t worry, I’m not in a panic over this. I’ve been aware of the paper since it was released. The other papers are just as bad. Especially the new one published yesterday in Nature (n=300k+ with ~5 percent variance explained; same with Hill et al’s other paper at 7 percent, all capturing social class stratification). The “Hsu boundary” (1 million people GWAS for ‘intelligence’) and it won’t be anything special. Then what?
Shout-outs to RR. Hope you haven’t committed seppuku yet.
you need a pool cue up your ass from pill gman.
Frontal lobe dementia^^
Very clever! Cute and clever!
”The paperβs quite complex and there are some people here who no matter how many times they read it, will never be able to understand it. They simply donβt have the physiological genetic brain power to process such complex reading material.”
Jees,
pp use science to [redacted by pp, may 30, 2018]…
pp, the most important is the capacity to judge well and to understand the most important aspects of this studies, to do the best we can about it, if we are capable to do it.
I doubt if you truly understand twin studies AND behavior.
Be capable to repeat sentences = /= understanding.
What ”heritability” really is***
please, i don’t want wikipedia link.
We take two genetically similar or identical persons, when we do it with identical twins, of course, and analyse how similar they are one each other in given trait. There are different classes of identical twins because many them are not ”just-like clones”. Clone is the copy of the same person, a twin is near to be like cloning, but still is not there.
As we know, heritability is not herdability. It’s possibly show how non-environmental influenced a given trait is. This, we can do with only one person. We, at priori, don’t need a identical twin brothers to analyse this proportion. I love to say, if most people have a decent self knowledge and rational thinking, they would be capable to deduct their levels of innativity by themselves.
Remember, clones are 100% genetically identical, identical twins and specially the most identical ones are very near to be ”100%” but still not.
And i’m not try to arguing against OBVIOUS innate predominance in behavior. I don’t need a scientific study to prove what my eyes and my instincts perceive all the time even in myself.
Is behavior intentional or goal-directed?
What is the difference between intention and goal-directed*
“intentional” meaning contentful mental states.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
Goal-directed is self-explanatory.
Behavior is dispositional, intentional behavior is a contradiction.
From the SEP article:
Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs.
ok.
Impression that all intentions are goal-directed… π
Example, my intention with this comment is…
Intention: what i want to do.
Goal-directed behavior: ,,,
intentionality = objectivity
I have the intention
I have the goal
Behaviors aren’t goal-directed.
Of course they are!
Behavior is dispositional.
Define “behavior”
“Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs.”
What? I don’t understand the difference. Explain it better in simple terms.
Intentionality: “the quality of mental states (e.g. thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes) which consists in their being directed towards some object or state of affairs.”
Goal-directed: “aimed toward a goal or toward completion of a task”
I presume you mean this?
Still don’t understand the question. People have no idea what they’re doing 99% of the time, they just do what feels good or on a whim.
It’s basically the same thing, only rr think it’s deserve a debate…
PP,
“Define βbehaviorβ”
Dispositional.
Fenoopy,
“What? I donβt understand the difference. Explain it better in simple terms.”
“Still donβt understand the question. People have no idea what theyβre doing 99% of the time, they just do what feels good or on a whim.”
Actions are intentional; behavior is dispositional.”Goal-directed behavior”, “intentional behavior” is a contradiction. Actions are intentional.
Read:
Click to access actions-reasons-and-causes.pdf
Dispositional? Are you saying behavior is emotion/personality?
Psychological concepts do not fit into any type of lawlike generalizations about human behavior. Psychology can never “predict behavior” like physics, even though psychological events are physical events—mental states are irreducible to physical states (the mental underdetermines the physical).
P1) To explain psychological events, we need to rely on terms like “desire”, “rationality”, “consistency”, and “coherence”
P2) If there were a lawlike account of psychological events, we would need to dispense with such concepts since they are external impositions on the events.
P3) We can’t dispense with such concepts when discussing psychological events.
C) Therefore psychophysical laws don’t exist
Thus psychological events necessarily fit into a set of deterministic physical laws
P1) For psychological events to be reduced to physical descriptions, there would have to be physical equivalents to terms like “rationality”, “consistency”, “desire”
P2) No such physical equivalents of these terms (and other psychological terms) exist
C) Thus, psychological terms described as physical events (when using the language of psychology) cannot be reduced to physical explanations
Read “Psychology as Philosophy” by Donald Davidson.
Going off the first argument, we can also argue:
P1) In order for psychological traits to be genetically inherited, laws are required linking mental events under their mental descriptions and physical events under their physical descriptions
P2) No such laws exist
C) Therefore psychological traits cannot be inherited
(Post this comment, not the other. Wrong thread.)
Reasons are causes for actions. But behavior cannot be intentional.
Read Actions, Reasons, and Causes by Donald Davidson linked in the comment you responded to.
Actions are intentional. Behavior is not an action.
Gibberish
No it’s not. Read the Davidson paper.
Jesus, help us!!!!
”Actions are intentional. Behavior is not an action.”
when rr think for himself we have this…
there are two concepts for action
pure concept
related with reaction, if reaction is often encapsulated by this first concept
Behavior can be understood as a LAW, a pattern, i even think what differentiate existence and nonexistence is this absolutely fundamental law.
You don’t know what you’re talking about.
Actions are intentional. Saying that behavior is “intentional” is a contradiction. Thus, behavior is not an action.
If behavior’s not intentional, why do scientists define intelligence as goal-directed adaptive behaviour?
Why do judges reward people for “good behavior” if it’s not intended?
You or your source are just making up your own defenition that make no sense.
Because scientists aren’t philosophers. Donald Davidson didn’t “make anything up”.
Are actions explained by physical facts?
The position is also laid out with the arguments against the existence of psychophysical laws, and the argument against the genetic transmission of psychological traits.
Saying “what about scientists saying X” is irrelevant. Read the Davidson paper.
Please explain the logic by which behavior can not be intentional.
Descriptions of intentional (even psychological) phenomena cannot be reduced to descriptions of behavior. You should read the SEP article on intentionality.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
Do you have a quote from Donald Davidson saying behavior can’t be intentional? This description of his work implies he agreed with me that it very much can:
This idea is especially important, however, as it provides a means by which the same item of behaviour can be understood as intentional under some descriptions but not under others. Thus my action of flipping the light switch can be redescribed as the act of turning on the light (under which it is intentional) and also as the act of alerting the prowler who, unbeknown to me, is lurking in the bushes outside (under which it is unintentional).
That quote describes in 2 ways: as a primary reason (a cause of said action) and desire.
Davidson’s example speaks of action, not behavior. Action is intentional, behavior is dispositional.
X can be goal-directed, which in the case of X is an action, but if X is a behavior it cannot be goal-directed meaning behavior is not an action meaning actions are intentional.
Either way, his anomalous monism argument uses aspects of his decision theory/theory of action work. He was pretty critical of psychology, especially.
Davidsonβs example speaks of action, not behavior.
That’s not what my source says. Anyway, 99.9% of people define behavior as including intentional acts, so have fun speaking your own language but I’m gona stick with English.
I doubt Davidson ever denied behavior could be intentional, he was probably just defining action as the subset of behavior that’s intentional. So while all actions are intentional, only some behaviors are.
Those motives can be reduced to physical states though. That’s how artificial intelligence is made: with artificial motives. The artificial intelligence seeks to fulfill a ‘desire’ determined by its creator. It’s the same in humans, only we have many desires that depend on many things.
“Those motives can be reduced to physical states though.”
Nope. Reread the arguments.
“You donβt know what youβre talking about.”
No. You don’t know what you’re talking about.
Mental events cannot cause random physical ones, like a tornado, or a burgler murdering you, rationality can only be prescribed to an action after the fact, and mental states are products of previous ones. That’s what anomalous monism is. It does not mean mental traits cannot be inherited that’s a ridiculous leap in logic you chose to indulge in all by yourself.
You’re essentially arguing stochastic connectivity, when you’ve already shown me evidence of stress being epigenetically inherited. Memories themselves are inherited through RNA.
These are two separate issues and you cannot extrapolate the latter from the former. Until you familiarize yourself with probabilistic causation, you’ll just continue to make the same mistake.
In regards to the content of Pumpkin’s post
“This is going to send commenter RR into panic mode.”
No it won’t. Only intelligent people are able to recognize faults in their reasoning.
Missing heritability is more than likely due to epigenetics, polygenic traits, and gene x environment interactions.
I believe the polygenic theory is the most favorable, because the number of associative hits that have been identified and replicated have steadily increased with sample size in each experiment.
“No. You donβt know what youβre talking about.”
I clearly do. You didn’t address any premise.
“It does not mean mental traits cannot be inherited thatβs a ridiculous leap in logic you chose to indulge in all by yourself.”
Where’s the error in my reasoning?
“Missing heritability is more than likely due to epigenetics, polygenic traits, and gene x environment interactions.”
The heritability isn’t there; the EEA is false.
“I doubt Davidson ever denied behavior could be intentional, he was probably just defining action as the subset of behavior thatβs intentional. So while all actions are intentional, only some behaviors are.”
“Intentional behavior” is a contradiction. Actions are intentional; behavior is dispositional. Read some action theory.
Behavior can be selected since it’s dispositional; cognition cannot be selected for since there are no psychophysical laws.
Where are you getting this idiotic idea that intentions and dispositions are mutually exclusive?
I’m disposed to wear a jacket because i intend to stay warm.
Yes behavior is selected but intentional behavior is caused by cognition & emotion, so you can’t select behavior without selecting its mental causes.
Intentional behavior is a contradiction. Cognition can’t be selected because there aren’t psychophysical laws (see above arguments). Behavior is dispositional, thus it can be selected. Since the mental underdetermines the physical—mental states are irreducible to brain states.
Are actions explained by physical facts?
Cognition canβt be selected because there arenβt psychophysical laws (see above arguments)
So you’re a creationist?
Which premise does that address?
You said cognition could not be selected. That means we couldn’t have evolved from apes.
Cognition can’t be selected for because there aren’t any psychophysical laws. Behavior—which is dispositional—can be selected for. Stating that cognition can’t be selected for doesn’t make me a “Creationist”.
Behaviorβwhich is dispositionalβcan be selected for.
If behavior can be selected, then whatever causes behavior can be selected by proxy.
And behavior (as defined by philosophers) can be intentional too. Here’s yet another source:
Thus, Dretske (1988) has espoused a componential view of behavior according to which an individual’s behavior is not to be identified, as on the functionalist conception, with his or her bodily movement: behavior is the process whereby some of the individual’s bodily movement is caused by one of his or her internal state. When the internal state has intentionality, the individual’s behavior is intentional. On the componential view of behavior, the intentionality of an individual’s mental state is not relevant to the causation of a particular bodily movement at time t. Rather, it is relevant to why types of movements are regularly caused by types of intentional states. The question is whether this move saves intentionality from epiphenomenalism.
Behavior can be selected because it’s dispositional. If behavior were cognitive it wouldn’t be able to be selected because there are no psychophysical laws.
X can be goal-directed, which in the case of X is an action, but if X is a behavior it cannot be goal-directed meaning behavior is not an action meaning actions are intentional thus behavior is not goal-directed and is not an action.
No behaviour can be goal directed; just provided a source saying it can be intentional.
But if you want to call goal directed behaviors actions and not behaviors it’s just semantics and doesn’t change the argument, because actions can be selected
Actions are controlled by the brain so selection for more intelligent actions will select for more intelligent brains
Can belief and desire be defined in behavioral terms?
“I clearly do. You didnβt address any premise.
Somebody who think’s “In order for psychological traits to be genetically inherited, laws are required linking mental events under their mental descriptions and physical events under their physical descriptions” is an appropriate follow up premise from the original conclusion does not understand anomalous monism. I did address it, It’s a non sequiter and is irrelevant to davidson’s original thesis.
“Whereβs the error in my reasoning?”
Your first premise is a non sequiter The randomness of mental events and their subsequent physical ones, has little to do with the whether mental states can be inherited. You can determine causality from probability. Theoretically, if you took a ‘snapshot’ of the epigenome in two parents and then another of the pristine genome/epigenome of their offspring you would see mental states being inherited. Reprogramming what make some of these tags lost in translation, which produces the uncertainty.
βMissing heritability is more than likely due to epigenetics, polygenic traits, and gene x environment interactions.β
“the EEA is false.”
That doesn’t falsify heritability, whats with you and the non sequiturs?
“Somebody who thinks … us an appropriate follow up premise from the conclusion does not understand anomalous monism.”
I clearly do. Psychophysical laws don’t exist. If psychophysical laws dont exist (laws linking mental or psychological states with physical states) then psychological traits cannot be inherited. It does follow from the two arguments I’ve provided.
“That doesn’t falsify heritability”
How does it make sense that X is 50 percent genes and 50 percent environment? h2 rests on the assumption that genes are additive—but this is false due to GxE, thus heritability estimates have no use.
(I should say heritability estimates have no use for humans since we can’t perfectly control for the environment like animal breeder’s and botanists can.)
You can determine causality from probability
No, you definitely cannot establish causation via probabilistic reasoning. You can make a case for a causal relationship, but that’s about it.
Theoretically, if you took a βsnapshotβ of the epigenome in two parents and then another of the pristine genome/epigenome of their offspring you would see mental states being inherited.
No you wouldn’t.
First, a mental state is a response to specific environmental stimulus, so how exactly would you know that the pristine genome of the offspring has inherited the mental states of the parents from this incomplete information?
Swank
“No, you definitely cannot establish causation via probabilistic reasoning.
When you’ve already deduced the mechanistic variable then you can infact infer causation from probability, because the only uncertainty present is that from confounding complexity.
“so how exactly would you know that the pristine genome of the offspring has inherited the mental states of the parents from this incomplete information?”
What you’re saying is nonsensical even in contexts outside of the brain. As heterogeneous organisms, you could not inherit a 1:1 genotype form your parents
and it’s ridiculous to expect as much. The same goes for mental states you only inherit some of the mental state or specifically the potential for it. Intelligence and fear are potentials, the issue is that you are already assuming the mind and the brain are different things.
RR,
“I clearly do. Psychophysical laws donβt exist.”
You clearly don’t, psychophysical laws do exist. Cutting off oxygen to your brain will surely cause you to die assuming all is held equal temporally(not a typo). Physical events always mechanistically precede mental ones, intentional or not. Therefore there is a strict psychophysical law: P1–>P2, P1–>M1, and M1P1 are all true and empirically observed laws. Assuming the same definition as davidson on i>strict laws:
For any causal relationship between particular events e1 and e2, there must be a law of the form β(C1 & D1) β D2β, where βC1β states a set of standing conditions, and βD1β is a description of e1 that is sufficient, given C1, for the occurrence of an event of the kind βD2β, which is a description of e2. Traditionally, a strict law has been thought of as one where the condition and event-types specified in the antecedent are such as to guarantee that the condition or event-types specified in the consequent occurβthe latter must occur if the former in fact obtain. But indeterministic or probabilistic versions of strict laws are possible as well (Davidson 1970, 219). The point that distinguishes strict laws is not so much the guaranteeing of the effect by satisfaction of the antecedent as the inclusion, in the antecedent, of all conditions and events that can be stated that could possibly prevent the occurrence of the effect. A strict indeterministic law would be one that specified everything required in order for some effect to occur. If the effect does not occur when those conditions obtain, there is nothing else that could be cited in explanation of this failure (other than the brute fact of an indeterministic universe).
“How does it make sense that X is 50 percent genes and 50 percent environment? h2 rests on the assumption that genes are additive”
Some genes stack in an additive manner. Twin,adoption,and family studies along with molecular analysis can identify gene/environment interactions.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5079103/
http://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC3647367&blobtype=pdf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3829379/
https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S108495211730280X?via%3Dihub
“psychophysical laws do exist”
no they don’t; my arguments establish they don’t.
https://pumpkinperson.com/2018/05/30/new-paper-claims-to-have-solved-the-missing-heritability-problem/#comment-92688
https://pumpkinperson.com/2018/05/30/new-paper-claims-to-have-solved-the-missing-heritability-problem/#comment-92692
“Some genes stack in an additive manner”
Genes can’t cause psychological traits since there are no psychophysical laws. Either way, again, h2 assumes additive effects, i.e., that GxE do not interact. If the assumption is wrong, the “heritability” estimates are wrong.
“Twin,adoption,and family studies along with molecular analysis can identify gene/environment interaction.”
All three of them capture similar environments; all three of them are no better than each other at detangling genes from environment.
… the twin method is no more able than a family study ti disentangle potential influences of genes and environment. In other words, the twin method is clearly unable to disentangle these influences. This leads to the conclusion that genetic interpretations of all past, present, and future MZT-DZT twin method comparisons in the social and behavioral sciences must be rejected outright. (Joseph, 2014: 182)
When youβve already deduced the mechanistic variable
If the mechanistic variable has been deduced then there is no need for probabilistic reasoning…
What youβre saying is nonsensical
It doesn’t seem like you’ve understood what I’ve said. A mental state necessarily is an interaction between external stimuli and internal “stuff.” So you wouldn’t even know if a mental state had been inherited by looking at a ‘pristine’ genome. You would need to set the environmental inputs as equal, then observe the interaction relative to some unrelated control group to even see or make a case for mental states having been inherited.
Yea they can’t identify any mechanism. It’s hilarious.
“If the mechanistic variable has been deduced then there is no need for probabilistic reasoning⦔
Hahaha.
Psychophysical and psychological laws do not exist so this is a dumb conversation. Maybe you’ll understand that psychophysical and psychological laws don’t exist one day Melo and you can then stop talking about things you don’t understand.
Swank,
“If the mechanistic variable has been deduced then there is no need for probabilistic reasoning⦔
If you’re weighing multiple hypothesis that have established causal mechanisms then yeah you’re using probability. Furthermore from this holistic system causation can only be formed from statistical inferences.
” You would need to set the environmental inputs as equal, then observe the interaction relative to some unrelated control group to even see or make a case for mental states having been inherited.”
No it seems you’re misunderstanding. Im not saying Mental states are independent of stimuli to propagate them. Stress can be epigenetically inherited. Epigenetic tags can indicate mental predispositions ceteris paribus.
RR,
“my arguments establish they donβt.”
Your arguments establish nothing. The bifurcation is completely unwarranted. Psychophysical laws=Physical laws. If strict physical laws exist so do mental ones. I can entirely sidestep all of the anomalous by simply denying predicate dualism. AM is the perfect example of cognitive dissonance. Davidson was just another creative hack trying to reconcile monism with free will. mental events are commensurable. Maybe not strictly, but language evolves, as does technology.
“Genes canβt cause psychological traits since there are no psychophysical laws. ”
Even if There were no physical laws, that would not mean psychological traits are not inherited.
“If the assumption is wrong, the βheritabilityβ estimates are wrong.”
Why? Are there no ways to statistically control for such confounds?
“one day Melo and you can then stop talking about things you donβt understand.”
Hahaha.
“Psychophysical laws=Physical laws. If strict physical laws exist so do mental ones. I can entirely sidestep all of the anomalous by simply denying predicate dualism. AM is the perfect example of cognitive dissonance. Davidson was just another creative hack trying to reconcile monism with free will. mental events are commensurable. Maybe not strictly, but language evolves, as does technology.”
The mental is underdetermined by the physical.
“Even if There were no physical laws, that would not mean psychological traits are not inherited.”
Since there are no psychological or psychophysical laws, mental traits cannot be inherited. See the arguments above.
“Why? Are there no ways to statistically control for such confounds?””
Because the h2 model assumes no GxE interaction; that GxE interact screws up the formula. Jensen and FIsher ignored this.
“Hahaha.”
You said “When youβve already deduced the mechanistic variable then you can infact infer causation from probability, because the only uncertainty present is that from confounding complexity.” but if you know the mechanism, you don’t need probabilistic causation, so hahaha.
“The mental is underdetermined by the physical.”
That is a nonsensical statement, seeing how the physical is indistinguishable from the mental.
“Since there are no psychological or psychophysical laws, mental traits cannot be inherited. See the arguments above.”
Why? So you admit that you deny the validity of evolutionary theory.
p1 the nonexistence of psychophysical laws(apparently) means non psychological traits cannot be inherited genetically
p2 m=p
p3 no strict physical laws exist
c1 Physical states cannot be inherited genetically.
But that’s using your retarded logic. here’s a simple refutation of AM:
p1 Px always precedes Mx
p2 Px=Mx
p3 Px always precedes Px
c1 Strict physical laws exist on the highest level of interaction.
Of course this depends on how Davidson is defining “strict laws”, going by the definition on the Stanford page, there are in fact strict “psycho-physical” laws, this begs the question: why does he think high complexity= irreducibiility?
“Because the h2 model assumes no GxE interaction”
How can it assume that if they can identify gene/environment interaction?
“that GxE interact screws up the formula.”
How so?
“so hahaha.”
Are you seriously that desperate that you’re willing to copy Swank’s point? Either way, all holistic systems require probabilistic causation.
“That is a nonsensical statement, seeing how the physical is indistinguishable from the mental.”
How is the mental reducible to the physical?
“Why? So you admit that you deny the validity of evolutionary theory.”
I’ve already explained.
“c1 Strict physical laws exist on the highest level of interaction.”
Psychological discourse and physical discourse are governed by different principles; so if two forms of discourse are governed by different principles, then their predicates and terms cannot co-occur in law statements. So it follows that psychological and physical predicates cannot co-occur in law statements and so this shows that there can be no laws that are formulated on a psychological and physical vocabulary in conjunction.
Mental states are irreducible to physical states.
“How can it assume that if they can identify gene/environment interaction?”
The original formula assumes that. Just because GxE can be identified doesn’t mean it’s accounted for in the Falconer formula.
“How so?”
Because h2 assumes non-interaction.
“Are you seriously that desperate that youβre willing to copy Swankβs point? Either way, all holistic systems require probabilistic causation.”
It’s true; if you know the mechanism, you don’t need probabilistic causation. Is that wrong?
“How is the mental reducible to the physical?”
All physical events are reducible to other physical events. Therefore the mental is reducible to the physical, because P=M. Why is our world consistent of only one substance, rather than 2? Because it offers the least assumptions.
“Iβve already explained.”
Well now you need to explain why you’re supporting creationist Ideology.
“Psychological discourse and physical discourse are governed by different principles;”
But they’re not. You’re presenting a false dilemma.
“So it follows that psychological and physical predicates cannot co-occur in law statements and so this shows that there can be no laws that are formulated on a psychological and physical vocabulary in conjunction.”
Words are not things. Just because some words we use to describe mentality are not based in physical realities, does not mean there are mental properties that exist independent of physical ones. That’s another violation of occam’s razor.
“Because h2 assumes non-interaction.”
Go on.
“Itβs true; if you know the mechanism, you donβt need probabilistic causation. Is that wrong?”
Not if there’s more than one cause.
Something I must add, why you have you not answered my question? Why do you and Davidson assume complexity=irreducibly?
“All physical events are reducible to other physical events. Therefore the mental is reducible to the physical, because P=M. Why is our world consistent of only one substance, rather than 2? Because it offers the least assumptions.”
Mental states are irreducible to brain states; we can know everything about the brain and still not know about mental states because the mental is underdetermined by the physical. Intellectual capacity is underdetermined; genes cannot explain psychological differences because the mental is underdetermined by the physical.
“Well now you need to explain why youβre supporting creationist Ideology.”
I’m not.
“But theyβre not. Youβre presenting a false dilemma.”
Sure they are. my argument establishes it.
“Words are not things. Just because some words we use to describe mentality are not based in physical realities, does not mean there are mental properties that exist independent of physical ones. Thatβs another violation of occamβs razor.”
Not a response.
“Go on.”
It doesn’t account for gene/gene and gene/environment interactions; h2 estimates assume that G and E are independent of each other. But that’s false.
“Not if thereβs more than one cause.”
“Mechanisms” are genes.
“Something I must add, why you have you not answered my question? Why do you and Davidson assume complexity=irreducibly?”
I can’t speak for Davidson but I can speak for myself: Because the arguments are sound.
Take the last words in all of our conversations. you can look at it as “a win” if you’d like (debating is not about “winning”), but I’m too bored now and sick of wasting my time.
Adieu, till next time. Maybe we can discuss other things but this stuff is boring now. We can pick up in the future.
“Mental states are irreducible to brain states; we can know everything about the brain and still not know about mental states because the mental is underdetermined by the physical.”
Which mental states are you ignorant of? You can’t possibly justify dualism over monism. No scientist takes it seriously.
“Iβm not.”
Where is the error in my reasoning?:
“p1 the nonexistence of psychophysical laws(apparently) means non psychological traits cannot be inherited genetically
p2 m=p
p3 no strict physical laws exist
c1 Physical states cannot be inherited genetically.”
“Sure they are. my argument establishes it.”
I’m waiting for you to address my point. What justifies the false dichotomy?
“Not a response.”
How so? The anomalous of the mental resides in it’s “incommensurate vocabulary”.
“I can speak for myself: Because the arguments are sound.”
That’s not answering my question.
‘(debating is not about βwinningβ)”
It’s not a debate when your opponent has no intellectual integrity.
” but Iβm too bored now and sick of wasting my time.”
Spoken like a true puss.
“Which mental states are you ignorant of? You canβt possibly justify dualism over monism. No scientist takes it seriously.”
The mental is not amenable to scientific investigation.
“Where is the error in my reasoning?:”
M does not equal P.
“Iβm waiting for you to address my point. What justifies the false dichotomy?”
My argument.
“How so?”
Because the mental is undetermined by the physical.
“Thatβs not answering my question”
Yes it is. The answer is because no psychophysical or psychological laws exist.
“Spoken like a true puss.”
Spoken like a true adult.
“The mental is not amenable to scientific investigation.”
So the weather is not amenable to scientific investigation?
“M does not equal P.”
All properties of this world=P
Top result
https://www.google.com/search?q=the+many+fallacies+of+dualism&oq=the+many+fallacies+of+dualism&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60l2.5144j1j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
“My argument.”
Which one?
“Because the mental is undetermined by the physical.”
How does that address my refutation?:
Words are not things. Just because some words we use to describe mentality are not based in physical realities, does not mean there are mental properties that exist independent of physical ones. Thatβs another violation of occamβs razor.
“The answer is because no psychophysical or psychological laws exist.”
LOL, that is not an answer to: “Why do you and Davidson assume complexity=irreducibly?”
So far that’s circular reasoning, strawman, false dilemma, and ad nauseam.
“Spoken like a true adult.”
Hahaha.
“So the weather is not amenable to scientific investigation?”
Sure it is. The mental isn’t because the mental is irreducible to the physical.
“Top result”
So?
“which one?”
Against the existence of psychophysical and psychological laws.
“So far thatβs circular reasoning, strawman, false dilemma, and ad nauseum”
I’ve probably strawmanned you before. Shit happens. No circularity. Ad nauseum-ing, you do too. What false dilemma?
But if I were to argue against your accusations then what? Is it right or not? Because you argue against my fallacy accusations. When is it fine to do so,master logician?
“Sure it is. ”
“Typically the meteorologist will use the vocabulary of fronts, atmospheric pressure, types of cloud formations etc. in attempting to describe and predict the weather. The meteorologist will also no doubt utilise a body of generalisations to help in this predictive task, which will be couched in this vocabulary. However, due to the tremendous complexity of the atmosphere, and the limits on our information gathering technology, the meteorologist will never be able to produce a totally accurate characterisation of the weather at any one time, let alone produce an accurate short term forecast.”
So according to your logic the meteorologic vocabulary is irreducible to the weather, therefore the weather is not amenable to scientific investigation. Stupidity at it’s finest.
“So?”
So, if you disagree that P=M then you are not endorsing anomalous monism, but instead some kind of substance dualism. The link I presented directly refutes dualism by showing it’s abhorrent absurdity.
“Against the existence of psychophysical and psychological laws.”
Well I’ve already shown plenty of psycho-physical laws.
“Shit happens. No circularity. Ad nauseum-ing, you do too. What false dilemma?”
It happens all the time, so either you have severe reading difficulties or you’re intellectually dishonest. Yes circularity, for examle you stated:
“we can know everything about the brain and we would not be able to explain mental states since the mental is irreducible to the physical.”
I responded:T”he brain and the mental are not exclusive properties.”
You disagreed, I asked “why?”
and you essentially repeated the first assertion: “Because the mental is irreducible to the physical.”
That’s ad nauseam and circular reasoning. And no, i don’t ad nauseam, you just repeat assertions, which forces me to do the same.
“Is it right or not? Because you argue against my fallacy accusations. When is it fine to do so,master logician?”
What do you mean? If I accuse you of fallacious reasoning and you can’t explain why its not fallacious then, your contention is wrong, plain and simple.
“What false dilemma?”
Dualism is a false dillemma.
The mental is irreducible to the physical because it is normative; normative facts are irreducible to dispositional facts. (You’ve established no existence of psychophysical laws—because they do not exist.)
What is your response to Balgrami’s Moore-Frege-Moore pincer argument and Kripke’s rule-following argument?
“The mental is irreducible to the physical because it is normative; normative facts are irreducible to dispositional facts. (Youβve established no existence of psychophysical lawsβbecause they do not exist.)”
The is-ought problem only successfully extends to arguments on morality, not decision making, and what we denote as rational is completely quantifiable. the psycho-physical laws I presented are essentially decision making algorithms. We can predict thoughts. You have no free will. Go ahead, repeat yourself and prove me right.
What’s your response?
I don’t really have one, I don’t necessarily disagree with semantic holism but, it’s ultimately irrelevant to whether P is reducible to M, at least concerning their functional properties.
The mental is irreducible to the physical. See Kripke’s rule-following argument.
“See Kripkeβs rule-following argument.”
The physical interactions we observe are not equivalent to the language(including math) that we use to describe it. P= M and is therefore reducible.
What’s the argument?
“Whatβs the argument?”
You seem confused. No argument is required from me. Extraordinary claims require Extraordinary evidence. AM and any position that reflects property dualism to a metaphysical extent, could not and does not rebuke all of scientific investigation on the brain and the behavior it propagates. Neuroscience has better explanatory power than any argument you have produced and is of course filled with much less assumptions.
There’s no argument?
“Thereβs no argument?”
P1 Arguments consist of premises and conclusions
P2 Claims backed by empirical observations are premises, conclusions are the overall point a claim is trying to buttress
P3 My claims are empirically backed, my conclusion is formed from these claims
C1 I am producing a legitimate form of an argument.
Still waiting.
Do I need one if yours falls flat on it’s face?
No inference rules.
“No inference rules.”
Still waiting. Moving goal posts as usual huh?
Haha
Still waiting.
Santo, high heritability just means that most of the IQ differences between people in a given population are caused by DNA differences.
If they’re not caused by DNA but by other factors like nutrition, education etc, heritability is low.
It’s expressed as a number ranging from 100% heritable (1.0) to 0% heritable (0.0)
And those estimates aren’t valid because the EEA is false.
PP,
i think heritable mean ”what may/can be inherited”.
First problem of heritability is its own etimology, any similar word, substantive or adjective, often mean ”something can/will be…”
heritable, charitable, understandable…
”Heritability” would be a try to measure inheritance without a context, instead analyse inheritance over genealogies and historical evolutionary dynamics, this people analyse levels of phenotypical similarities among diversely identical twins to see how environment impact them specially when they are created separately.
The example of homossexuality is interesting
”they perceived ‘lower’ levels of heritability among identical twins”
so…
they concluded…
so, maybe homossexuality is more environmental; or
is defined during prenatal period…
maybe, but
firstly
they analysed the levels of similarity among concordant homossexual twins and discordant [one homo and one… hetero]**
sometimes i think many scientists are very lazy…
If something is primarily caused by DNA so we must look at the DNA to figure out.
Heritability shows how similar identical twins can be, first of all.
PP,
IQ as well all behaviors have a origin or principle, and most behavior have a BIOLOGICAL origin. But IQ is not a behavior, it’s a measurement, and it’s a culturally-charged measurement because people must be literate and numerate to be fully capable to score in-line with western standards. What many people don’t understand or can’t accept is that people have different potential and different achievements regards to ”IQ”/educational levels, so when a random group of underage is exposed to basic scholastic knowledge they will learn differently, even people with very similar IQ scores, often have differences which cannot be observed by IQ
So, ”IQ is just” if all of us of this blog were placed in violin lessons. We would learn differently, in qualitative and in quantitative levels, because we are different, we have different intrinsic motivations and of course, different cognitive levels specifically for this type of task. The difference between learn how to play a violin and what IQ measure, specially about culture, is that language is fundamental for us. Of course it’s about EVERYTHING.
I’m not against genetic or better, biological determinism, or even better, biological pre-dominance over environment on behavior. But i find this subject, not just difficult but confuse.
So when you say intelligence is ”80% heritable” you mean ”80% of our intelligence is genetically or biologically determined**”
If yes, so my homossexuality is ”30%” biologically determined*
Stupid questions but…
Do you know homossexuality often or seems have a impact on intelligence expression* specially about ”normatively expected” ones*
http://www.wiringthebrain.com/2018/05/grandmas-trauma-critical-appraisal-of.html?spref=tw&m=1
“First problem of heritability”
The first problem of “heritability” is that people think it means “inheritable”, which is of course not true.
Click to access 10.1002%40wcs.1400.pdf
If you view behavior as something that is basic…stimulus + organism reacting to stimulus.
And you view an action as only the result of the organism’s higher sensory perceptions, i.e. wants/needs/personal attitudes about satisfying them.
Then an action wouldn’t be selected for. An action is “I jump 2 feet off the ground because I believe jumping two feet off the ground will appease the God Quetzalcoatl.” A behavior is “a blade trap springs up from a dark corridor in King Tut’s tomb and I jump two feet off the ground.” A behavior would be subject to selection because it involves the stimulus and is pure reaction to stimulus. However, an action, even if it takes place within the same context, wouldn’t be selected for.
Whatever causes the behavior may not be selected by proxy because problem there is to assume human beings must follow a rational thought process — or that the set of rational belief systems that lead to the individual not jumping two feet off the ground is somehow lower than the set that has the individual jumping two feet off the ground. The set of beliefs about satisfying wants/needs and the connection to acts that follow those beliefs, with rationality/logic removed, may well be infinite. So any particular set of beliefs wouldn’t be selected for and consequently no particular action…just the behavior itself.
Anyone who walks down King Tut’s tomb and jumps two feet when the trap is set will be selected for, regardless of intention.
What about more complex behaviors like building a fire when it’s cold? This is unlikely to occur in those without the intention of keeping warm, thus selection for goal directed activity.
Well, going by the definition above, actions still aren’t being selected for. The behavior is just doing all of the things necessary to build a fire in the presence of cold.
The intentions still aren’t being selected for. ‘Build a fire cause it’s cold,’ ‘build a fire because I like how it looks,’ etc. etc., and the same problems from above with suggesting any particular goal behind the intentions is being selected for apply here as well.
Specific intentions might not be selected for, but broad intentions (seek pleasure, avoid pain) would be. Few people built fires in the cold without intending to, and those who did so by accident didn’t pass the behavior to their kids because it was luck.
(seek pleasure, avoid pain)
Not really. If someone walks around with an ‘I must seek pleasure/avoid pain’ intention all that matters if whether the adjoining beliefs about what gains pleasure and avoids pain manifest in acts that are consistent with behaviors that are selected for. And as I have said, the beliefs about how to do X or Y are a necessary component of action, and because human beings are not necessarily rational and rational belief systems that lead to a selected for behavior are not necessarily outnumbered by rational belief systems that lead to maladaptive (evolutionary term sense) behavior, broad intentions still would not be selected for.
Few people built fires in the cold without intending to
Even accepting that as true, the intentions that manifested as behavior wouldn’t be selected for.
Swank, why did we evolve pain if we did not evolve the intention to avoid it? Seems like needless suffering if it doesn’t function as a motivator.
The feeling of pain is not an action. Pain is just a sensation.
And a knee-jerk reflex is also not an action.
What to do about pain is a completely different matter. I would argue that enduring pain and not avoiding it are equally as important as avoiding it.
As example, courage is acting against the source of fear despite the fear. That isn’t avoiding the pain. It’s enduring it.
So again, intentions remain apart from the selection process under this rubric.
Pain is a feeling but trying to avoid it is an intention. Pain evolved to motivate us to avoid things that threaten our survival or reproduction.
We feel pain when we jump off a tree but that only helps us survive if we’re smart enough to learn from the experience and intend to avoid it next time. So pain, intelligence and intention were selected together.
I know that trying to avoid it is an intention. Choosing not to avoid it is also an intention. Not only that, but the belief about how to either avoid it or not is also a necessary component of the action. So based on the above…you can have an intention to not avoid it combined with a belief that actually has the actor — in the eyes of a third party — avoiding it.
The tree example doesn’t really lead anywhere if the fall didn’t kill you. Selection isn’t really operating there. Some behaviors that ‘avoid’ the pain of jumping out a tree will be selected against — i.e. avoiding trees altogether even though they have fruit in the branches and there’s no food anywhere else.
But if you jump out of a tree enough times it will kill you. So we evolved pain to motivate us to avoid suicidal things like jumping from trees, touching fire & walking on sharp rocks.
That doesn’t mean we avoid trees, but we climb down instead of jumping. Those who couldn’t feel pain, or were too dumb to learn that jumping from trees caused their pain, got killed, leaving pain avoiders as the survivors.
Yes in rare cases tolerating pain is useful but that’s usually because the environment has changed so much that the reason the pain evolved in the first place is obsolete.
We also feel emotional pain (loneliness, sexual frustration) when we can’t find a mate, so pain not only motivated survival but reproduction. And the emotional pain we feel when our children feel pain motivates us to advance our offspring’s survival.
If pain was selected then intention was selected cause pain by defenition is the feeling we intend to avoid.
“If pain was selected then intention was selected cause pain by defenition is the feeling we intend to avoid.”
Pain is a non-intentional mental state.
No pain is intention. Pain is an undesirable feeling, so if you can feel the difference between desirable and undesirable, you have intention, because intention = desire. I intend to eat lunch because I desire lunch. Having lunch gives me pleasure and starving gives me pain.
Except for the person who’s pain it is, it’s non-intentional. It’s a subjective mental experience, i.e., a mental event and not a physical event.
It’s a subjective experience you want to stop. To want something is intention.
You’re wrong. It’s non-intentional.
Yes in rare cases tolerating pain is useful
Learning itself empirically causes pain. And if you’re going to stipulate that g determines the extent to which one can learn, IQ still is a set of learned skills. So if it were as simple as ‘pain’ caused us to ‘evolve’ the intent to avoid pain, then why do people constantly engage in the learning process? And why, according to HBDers, has this trait that consists of learned skills become or been so important? Couple that with the innumerable times in life one must demonstrate courage to get what one wants and it’s doubtful that it’s a “rare case” tolerating pain is useful.
That doesnβt mean we avoid trees
Why not? You’re ignoring the other half of an action — the belief about how best to go about doing something. Avoiding trees seems to be as likely a belief about how to avoid the pain of falling out of a tree than anything else.
If pain was selected then intention was selected cause pain by defenition is the feeling we intend to avoid.
No, pain “by definition” is just a feeling. You’ve presented nothing even suggesting that generally avoiding pain is preferable to enduring pain.
Learning itself empirically causes pain. And if youβre going to stipulate that g determines the extent to which one can learn, IQ still is a set of learned skills. So if it were as simple as βpainβ caused us to βevolveβ the intent to avoid pain, then why do people constantly engage in the learning process?
We’re constantly learning what causes pain and how to avoid it.
And why, according to HBDers, has this trait that consists of learned skills become or been so important? Couple that with the innumerable times in life one must demonstrate courage to get what one wants and itβs doubtful that itβs a βrare caseβ tolerating pain is useful.
Courageous people are only tolerating pain to avoid a greater pain (i.e. I tolerate the pain of getting bit by a tiger to avoid the greater pain of seeing my child get eaten by a tiger)
Why not? Youβre ignoring the other half of an action β the belief about how best to go about doing something. Avoiding trees seems to be as likely a belief about how to avoid the pain of falling out of a tree than anything else.
But you also want to avoid the pain of starving, so you can’t avoid the fruit tree if that’s where food grows. So if you overgeneralize from the experience (avoid all trees) you feel pain, and if you undergeneralize from the experience (still keep jumping) you feel pain, leaving only those with the smarts to make the correct inference (trees are safe as long as you climb down carefully) as the survivors.
No, pain βby definitionβ is just a feeling.
Just a feeling you want to stop, as opposed to pleasure which is feeling you want to continue. Once you prefer one outcome over another you have volition, will, intention, purpose, and once you have these goals, you need more and more intelligence to calculate how to reach them.
Youβve presented nothing even suggesting that generally avoiding pain is preferable to enduring pain.
The fact that most animals try to avoid pain except when tolerating it allows them to avoid greater pain.
”The feeling of pain is not an action”
feeling is a anticipatory or simulatory reaction, aka, empathy, an action…
A plant which stay erect is an action..
Weβre constantly learning what causes pain and how to avoid it.
Learning itself causes pain, so even in “learning what causes pain and how to avoid it” resisting the impulse to avoid pain is paramount.
Courageous people are only tolerating pain to avoid a greater pain
Not necessarily, e.g. choosing to win a glorious battle through suffering versus a painless death via gunshot to the head.
But you also want to avoid the pain of starving, so you canβt avoid the fruit tree if thatβs where food grows.
Indeed, so you agree that pain in and of itself does not necessitate evolving an intent to ‘avoid pain.’ And as we see from above, it also does not necessitate an intent to avoid greater pain.
Once you prefer one outcome over another you have volition, will, intention, purpose, and once you have these goals, you need more and more intelligence to calculate how to reach them.
Yes but selection will not act on will or intention, nor will it act on the belief system (rational or no). It will only act on the raw behavior, as explained above.
The fact that most animals try to avoid pain except when tolerating it allows them to avoid greater pain.
Only one animal is capable of action as defined above — human beings — that we are aware of, so my point stands.
You can have the last word π
Learning itself causes pain, so even in βlearning what causes pain and how to avoid itβ resisting the impulse to avoid pain is paramount.
Not sure what you mean, but I’m thinking of very simple intelligence tests given to animals. They walk down a straight path that suddenly forks and those who turn to the left get an eclectic shock (pain). The larger the animal’s brain, relative to its body, the fewer trials it needs to learn to avoid turning left, so at least in this research, the intelligent learn from pain and figure out how to avoid it.
Not necessarily, e.g. choosing to win a glorious battle through suffering versus a painless death via gunshot to the head.
Well I would argue that for men raised in honor culture, the shame of a dishonorable death is so emotionally painful that it’s less painful to physically suffer.
Yes but selection will not act on will or intention, nor will it act on the belief system (rational or no). It will only act on the raw behavior, as explained above.
But if most of the animals who display behavior A, do so because of intention A, then it’s unlikely that behavior A will be selected without also selecting for intention A by proxy. Now there are cases where behaviors are selected even though the evolutionary value of said behavior is not intended. Sex is a good example. Sexually active animals are selected because they reproduce, even though reproduction is not their intent and they don’t even realize they’re making babies. Even today people who don’t intend to make babies will be selected if they engage in unprotected sex nonetheless. Maybe that’s what philosophers mean when they say intent is not selected (assuming any philosopher actually said this).
But the intention that did get selected is an extremely powerful sex drive. The fact that billions of people go out every night with the intention of getting laid should be all the proof you need that intention can and did get selected.
You can have the last word π
Thank you Sir.
“Only one animal is capable of action as defined above β human beings β that we are aware of, so my point stands.”
Pretty much.
Actions are intentional states. Do animals (don’t say “humans are animals!”, you know what i mean) have intentional states?
Also PP, some argue that pain is a behavioral disposition.
Pedigree-based estimates and molecular genetic estimates may differ because current genotyping platforms are poor at tagging causal variants, variants with low minor allele frequency, copy number variants, and structural variants. Using ~20 000 individuals in the Generation Scotland family cohort genotyped for ~520 000 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), we exploit the high levels of linkage disequilibrium (LD) found in members of the same family to quantify the total effect of genetic variants that are not tagged in GWASs of unrelated individuals. In our models, genetic variants in low LD with genotyped SNPs explain over half of the genetic variance in intelligence, education, and neuroticism.
How does this solve it? Just sounds like another model sans hard evidence that could theoretically explain the discrepancy….
molecular genetic evidence?
“In this study, no variants were identified, but we do demonstrate that quantitative genetic estimates of heritability based on molecular information can equal those based on pedigree/family information for intelligence and education.”
In this study, no variants were identified
So? Their existence was still inferred.
can equal
Can as in did.
“So? Their existence was still inferred.”
So? That’s not really relevant because even after “inferring” their existence, they need to do a whole bunch of other analyses to identify the mechanisms, and how the mechanisms lead to differences in trait variation—along with which molecular genetic pathways lead to trait variation.
More work needed but it’s a far higher correlation than GWCT has provided & it holds despite corrections for shared environment effects.
Source for “corrections for shared environment effects”?
“A new paper claims to have found molecular genetic evidence” is what you said.
It did not find molecular genetic evidence. It posited a model that would reconcile the apparent conflict between “actual molecular genetic evidence” and the correlational evidence.
No they had correlation evidence from Scotland to test their model
Molecular correlation evidence
There are A LOT of things we are not analysing to see how intelligence can be passed from fathers to their sons.
If a son have a lower general cognitive skills than their parents it’s mean what**
Environmentally caused or biologically caused** [the son inherited from their parents a combination of their genes-liked with cognition which reduced their potential… and we are even looking for compensatory effects because IQists only pay attention to IQ].
“There are A LOT of things we are not analysing to see how intelligence can be passed from fathers to their sons.”
The genetic transmission of psychological traits is logically impossible.
https://pumpkinperson.com/2018/05/30/new-paper-claims-to-have-solved-the-missing-heritability-problem/comment-page-1/#comment-92688
https://pumpkinperson.com/2018/05/30/new-paper-claims-to-have-solved-the-missing-heritability-problem/comment-page-1/#comment-92692
Fathers genes do not effect the son’s intelligence.
Got it!
Psychophysical laws don’t exist.
Intelligence is not genetic in any way.
Got it!
Genes can’t cause psychological traits since there are no psychophysical or psychological laws. Got it?
Don feed the trolls!!! please!!!
amen
Yea that’s you.
when i’m masked of you…
RR: “The genetic transmission of psychological traits is logically impossible.”
the transmission of conditioning is impossible by genes.
psychological traits like personality can be transmitted by genes.
because personality is partially genetic and also a psychological trait.
genes effect the brain causing some psychological traits to exist.
a psychological trait that is caused by a brain trait is genetic.
because brain traits cause psychological differences in people.
a difference is a trait so brains genes and psychology is linked.
aggression levels as such is genetic and a psychological trait.
conditioning is not genetic
conditioned aggression is not genetic.
aggression levels can be passed on as a psychological trait.
Video on the genetic transmission of psychological traits.
Dmitry Belyaev and Fox Experiments
Behavior is dispositional. Behavior can be selected. Psychological traits cannot since there are no psychophysical or psychological laws.
behaviors are learned, not genetic
Behavior can be selected since it’s dispositional.
psych traits are hardcoded, thus are genetic
False. Psychophysical and psychological laws do not exist.
aggression levels are hardcoded thus is a psych trait
Psychophysical and psychological laws do not exist.
fixing a broken toy is a behavior
fixing broken toys can be selected
Behavior is dispositional. Behavior can be selected for. Actions are intentional. Actions cannot be selected for.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism
BF Skinner Foundation – Pigeon Turn
What’s the point?
rr just toss simple sentences or unreadable pseudo-scientific studies… don’t waste time with him, he believe it’s right about everything.
Where?
Personality traits are psychological traits.
Google:
big 5 personality traits heritability
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8776880
Psychological traits are genetic.
Broad genetic influence on the five dimensions of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness was estimated at 41%, 53%, 61%, 41%, and 44%, respectively.
RR cannot tell the difference between genetic and nongenetic psychological traits.
Heritable does not equal genetic. Either way there are many problems with that model.
“Heritable” in regard to heritability estimates.
I am not a behaviorist.
what are you?
A non-reductive physicalist.
With developmental systems theory thrown in.